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Fiscal Restraint, Total Demand
and Monetary Policy
I. OTAL demand for goods and services has con-
tinued to rise sharply, placing excessive claims on
our nation’s resources, Total spending increased 9
per cent in the year ending in the second quarter,
and pulled up prices by 4 per cent. From mid-1965
to mid-1967, spending rose at a 7.5 per cent average
annual rate and prices advanced at a 2.6 per cent
rate. Excessive total demand in recent years has been
fostered by a combination of very stimulative fiscal
and monetary actions,
On June 28, the “Revenue and Expenditure Con-
trol Act of 1968” was signed into law. This legisla-
tion was designed to alter the influence of the Fed-
eral budget so as to restrain private and Government
spending and therehy dampen inflationary pressures.
Included in the Act are provisions which increase
tax rates on individual and corporate income, extend
excise tax rates on automobiles and telephone serv-
ice at existing rates and moderate the growth of Gov-
ernment expenditures. Implementation of the Act is
expected to reduce sharply the Federal budget deficit.
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The fiscal program as proposed is intended to mod-
erate the budget stimulus as a factor contributing to
the current inflationary situation. This note assesses
the economic impact of the Act of 1968 by focusing
on the following considerations:
1. Recent trends in the growth of total demand,
real product and prices.
2. The outlook for growth of total demand, real
product and prices in light of the new fiscal
program.
3. The outlook for the U.S. balance of payments.
4. The outlook for financial markets and the im-
plications for monetary action.
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Total spending for goods and services rose 9 per
cent from the second quarter of 1967 to the second
quarter of 1968, accelerating from the 7.5 per cent
annual rate for the previous two years. From 1957
to 1965, total spending had increased at a 6 per cent
annual rate.
Total output of the economy expanded 5 per cent
in the year ending second quarter, an unsustainable
rate of growth. Expansion of real product is con-
strained by the growth of productive potential, which
is estimated to be increasing about 4 per cent per
year.
As a consequence of the rapid increase in the de-
mand for goods and services relative to supply, the
rate of price increase has accelerated. The general
level of prices advanced 4 per cent in the last year,
compared with a 3 per cent average rate over the
previous two years and a 1.6 per cent rate from 1957
to 1965.
The intensified inflationary pressures have been en-
couraged by highly expansionary monetary and fiscal
actions. The high-employment budget moved from
a $7 billion annual rate of surplus in the first half of
Page 31965 to a $14 billion deficit in the first half of 1968.
By comparison, this budget averaged a $9 billion sur-
plus from 1957 to 1965. The nation’s money stock
rose at a 5 per cent annual rate from early 1965 to
mid-1968, compared with an annual rate of 2.2 per
cent from 1957 to 1965.
The primary purpose of the Act of 1968 is to re-
duce inflationary pressures by moderating the growth
of total demand. Taking into account the fiscal pro-
gram and recent estimates of expenditures, the high-
employment budget is expected to move to a $12
billion rate of surplus in the first half of 1969 from a
rate of deficit of $14 billion a year earlier.t
The major features of the fiscal package are a re-
duction in spending for some items from the level
proposed in the Government’s budget for the year
ending June 30, 1968, and a 10 per cent surcharge
on corporate and individual income taxes. The sur-
charge on corporate income tax liability is retroactive
to January 1. For individuals the surcharge is retro-
active to April 1, which will mean a 7.5 per cent in-
crease in taxes on personal income earned in 1968.
The expenditure cuts included in the program ap-
ply to the level of spending in the Government’s
official budget which was proposed for the fiscal year
beginning July 1. In the January budget message, the
President proposed spending and net lending of
IBudget figures referred to here are in terms of the high-
employment budget, which differs from the Government’s
official budget. The high-employment budget excludes Gov-
ernment lending activities and conforms more closely to
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$186.1 billion in fiscal 1969. The fiscal program calls
for limiting the level to $180.1 billion, an increase of
$1.2 billion from fiscal 1968. Spending in excess of
this amount is allowable, however, if needed for
special support of Vietnam operations, interest on the
national debt, or veterans’ and social security bene-
fits. Expenditure estimates for Vietnam in fiscal 1969
have already been revised upward by $2.6 billion
from the level proposed in the budget. Interest on
the national debt is now expected to be almost $1
billion higher than previously estimated.
Taking into account revised expenditure estimates
and assuming other expenditures are controlled ac-
cording to the program, Federal spending on a high-
employment budget basis is now expected to rise 2.4
per cent from the first half of 1968 to the first half
of 1969. By comparison, high-employment budget ex-
penditures rose at a 15 per cent annual rate from
mid-1965 to 1968, and at a 6 per cent rate from 1957
to 1965.
The tax provisions of the program, plus an increase
in social security taxes effective January 1, 1969,
would provide an estimated $13 billion in additional
revenue in the year ending June 30, 1969. This esti-
mate includes $7 billion from individual income taxes,
$3 billion from the corporate surcharge, and $3 billion
in increased social security taxes.
The shift from deficit to surplus in the budget re-
flects, in addition to the effects of changed tax rates,
normal growth of revenues in an expanding economy.
If the tax surcharge is allowed to expire on June 30,
1969, it is estimated that the high-employment budget
surplus will drop sharply to near balance in the third
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Page 4quarter of 1969. The reliability of these projections
depends on how far the programs which are exempt
from the spending restrictions deviate from the levels
proposed in the January budget, and the extent to
which other programs are effectively limited by ex-
penditure controls.
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The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act is de-
signed to reduce the stimulative influence which fiscal
actions have exercised on the economy since 1965.
The amount of resources which has been required
for Vietnam operations has been greatly under-
estimated since 1965 and, as a result, expenditures
for defense have risen faster than budgeted amounts.
The sharp expansion of defense spending was under-
taken as the Government was accelerating expendi-
tures for domestic programs. Total outlays far out-
paced revenue, resulting in substantial budget defi-
cits. Federal Reserve action to reduce the impact of
heavy Government borrowing on financial markets
resulted in rapid monetary expansion. The combina-
tion of these fiscal and monetary developments stim-
ulated total demand, and the resulting pressure on a
fully-employed economy has been a major factor con-
tributing to price inflation and high interest rates.
Estimating the impact of the new fiscal program
is an inexact, but very important matter, and an as-
sessment of this impact is facilitated by examining
key segments of total demand in some detail.
Persona! Consumption. The thrust of the tax por-
tion of the fiscal program is aimed at individuals,
who will have to pay almost $7 billion in extra taxes
W
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in the year ending June 30, 1969. The surcharge is
expected to reduce the growth of consumer spending
by moderating gains in take-home pay. The manner
in which consumers respond to higher taxes will de-
terinine, in large measure, the impact of this part of
the fiscal program.
The extent to which individuals choose to pay
their increased tax liabilities from past saving, or by
reducing current saving, will tend to moderate the
restrictive effects of the fiscal program. From late 1966
to mid-1968, individuals allocated a larger share of
their income to savings. Personal saving averaged 7
per cent of disposable personal income over the pe-
riod, compared with an average rate of 6 per cent
from 1957 to 1966. A reduction in the saving rate of
one percentage point over the next year would free
almost $6 billion for spending, negating a large por-
tion of the restrictive effect of increased taxes.
Individuals base current spending plans to some
degree on past experience. The flow of income to
which persons have become accustomed is a very
important determinant of current and future con-
sumption. The fact that individuals have been ac-
cumulating a large amount of savings relative to in-
come suggests that the restraining effect of the added
tax may be attenuated. In addition, the ostensibly
temporary nature of the surcharge provides consumers
with an added incentive to regard the reduced flow
of income as a short-run factor, and to use their
wealth position to maintain spending.
Business Investment. Expenditures for plant and
equipment are based mainly on long range projec-
tions, and therefore depend on sales expectations
over an extended period. If businesses observe only
moderate easing of growth in consumer spending,
they will have continued incentive to carry through
with investment plans.
The cost and availability of funds are also impor-
tant in determining the strength of investment spend-
ing. Easing of upward pressure on market interest
rates might influence businesses to borrow funds for
investment projects. Such a development would coun-
ter the restrictive effect of the tax hike via reduced
cash flow to businesses. Furthermore, the fiscal pack-
age introduces the prospect of a tax advantage for
investment programs undertaken during the period
when increased tax rates are in effect, making the
investment tax credit more attractive.
Government Demand. Rapid expansion of Govern-
ment demand has been a major factor contributing to
the sharp increase in total demand experienced since
mid-1965, The provisions limiting Federal expendi-
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Page 5tures in fiscal 1969 imply a reduction in the growth
of Government demand for goods and services. How-
ever, the ability of the Government to restrain ex-
pansion of its demand for resources in the present
fiscal year remains to be proved.
Summary of Outlook for Total Demand. Aggregate
demand probably will continue to be strong for some
time, reflecting stimulative fiscal and monetary ac-
tions in the recent past. There is some doubt whether
fiscal actions will restrain economic activity greatly in
the immediate future. Many factors suggest that both
consumer and business spending may not respond to
the program of fiscal restraint to a degree sufficient
to reduce the pressure on prices significantly.
In addition to the pull of current total demand,
cost factors, reflecting past excessive demands, are
also exerting upward pressure on prices. The in-
flationary situation which has prevailed in the econ-
omy since 1965 has induced labor to seek wage
settlements which will compensate for purchasing
power lost to past price increases. The prolonged
period of inflation has probably also caused some
pressure for compensation for expected future infla-
tion. The fiscal package can do little immediately to
dampen this pressure. The tax hike itself might stim-
ulate demands for even larger settlements.
ffi•44Q .test:ro.in.t aIri.d 4..?&t:. .b0I0.fl.(.0(C)t
The impact of the fiscal program on total demand
and prices has important implications for the U.S.
balance of payments. The United States economy has
experienced a sharp decline in its foreign trade sur-
plus, reflecting the adverse effects of a rapid growth
of imports. Acceleration of domestic income has
increased the demand for foreign goods. If the trade
balance is to be restored to the strong surplus position
of previous years, the relative price position of
American products must be improved.
Since the rate of price increase cannot be expected
to moderate to a significant degree soon, little im-
provement in the balance of payments can be ex-
pected as the result of increased exports. Continued
rapid expansion of aggregate demand would also
tend to maintain imports at a high level relative to
exports. With little likelthood of rapid and significant
improvement on current account, capital flows become
the prime vehicle for improvement. In the first half
of 1968, high interest rates attracted a large amount
of foreign capital into the United States. Interest rate
declines in the second half of 1968 would reduce the
inflow of such capital.
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The fiscal program, if strictly followed, is expected
to reduce Government borrowing needs in fiscal 1969
by about $20 billion from the level of fiscal 1968.
This suggests that a great deal of the upward pres-
sure on interest rates will be removed over the course
of the fiscal year.
The response of monetary developments to such
possible easing of credit conditions deserves atten-
tion. Federal borrowing needs remain relatively large
in the second half of calendar 1968. The pressure of
this demand on financial markets, in addition to ex-
pected corporate borrowing to meet first-half tax lia-
bilities, suggests little immediate moderation in the
demand for lendable funds. Monetary expansion to
provide downward pressure on interest rates could
stimulate spending and reinforce upward pressure on
prices. Monetary expansion at or above recent rapid
rates would then work to negate the restrictive in-
fluence of the fiscal program.
The response of corporations and individuals to
the tax hike will depend in part on conditions in
financial markets. Other things unchanged, high in-
terest rates tend to reduce the amount of funds de-
manded by business for investment, and tend to
increase the attractiveness of saving relative to spend-
ing for individuals. Falling interest rates tend to
have opposite effects. Within a framework of fiscal ac-
tions aimed at reducing the growth of demand for
goods and services, and consequently dampening
inflationary pressure, monetary expansion to ease pres-
sure on interest rates might encourage both consumer
and business spending and discourage private saving.
Fiscal authorities have adopted a program of Fed-
eral budget restraint in an effort to combat excessive
total demand. It is hoped that this action will mod-
erate inflationary pressures while only slightly affect-
ing output and employment. However, an inflationary
psychology has become entrenched in the economy,
as evidenced by large wage settlements and the
rising costs of credit. If the Administration and the
Congress have finally assigned high priority to the
task of reducing inflationary pressures, monetary ac-
tions to complement the fiscal program are needed.
The possibility that the restraining effects of the sur-
charge may be attenuated, and also that expenditure
controls may not be fully implemented, reinforces
the desirability of avoiding monetary actions that
might counter the restrictive effects of the fiscal
program.
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